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I.

INTRODUCTION

[Our] local citizens are worried and concerned about
the impact of illegal aliens on our national security, crime
rates, illicit drug trade, the negative impacts on property
values, public schools,. . . our public hospital, taxes, welfare
costs, and other potential major problems ....
• . . [Because of] the inaction of our federal government,
[Farmer's Branch must] take whatever steps it legally can to
respond to the legitimate concerns of our citizens about the
utter breakdown and failure of the United States to enforce
immigration laws.
-City of Farmers Branch City Council Resolution'
The Farmers Branch ordinance is but one example of a
trend in this country of states and localities attempting to
take immigration matters into their own hands. This trend
to single out illegal immigrants for adverse treatment is
reminiscent of the "anti-Japanese fever" that existed in the
1940s . . . "[l]egislation of that type is not entitled to wear
the cloak of constitutionality."
-Judge Thomas M. Reavley 2
These statements embody the dominant and polarizing issues illegal
immigration presents today. On one hand, states and municipalities bear
the brunt of the substantial fiscal and social problems tied to undocumented immigrants and are left unprotected because of lax and increasingly exclusive federal enforcement. On the other hand, non-federal
entities, when attempting to counteract the adverse impacts that undocumented immigrants have on their communities, are often fueled by discriminatory animus and violate constitutional principles of equal protection.
This Comment concludes that the most comprehensive and prudent solution to these issues is for the Supreme Court to curtail its use of the federal
preemption doctrine, and to recognize the equal-protection concerns
1. City of Farmers Branch City Council Res. 2006-099 (Sept. 13, 2006) (following the resolution
the City subsequently passed a series of anti-illegal immigrant ordinances that were challenged in federal court), http://old.friendswood.com/agendas/cc061016%20Regular/CMO%2010-16-06%2ORegular/
Farmers%20Branch%2OLtr%20and%2ORes.pdf.
2. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d 524, 543 (5th Cir. 2013) (en
banc) (Reavley, J., concurring only in the judgment) (citing Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334
U.S. 410, 422 (1948)), cert. denied, 82 U.S.L.W. 3264 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2014) (No. 13-516).
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presented by ratcheting-up the level of scrutiny from rational basis to some
form of elevated scrutiny, albeit not strict scrutiny.
While numerous relevant legal theories exist, courts confronting the
proliferation of local legislation targeting undocumented immigrants have
uniformly selected federal preemption principles, an approach which necessarily restricts the analysis to whether the need for uniform application of
federal law dominates over the states' traditional police powers. But preemption jurisprudence is an imperfect tool of analysis for these issues. In
application, the doctrine invariably minimizes the ability of states to legislate in matters of local concern, while at the same time it fails to explicitly
address the concern that many of these laws are permeated with racial animus towards immigrants, contrary to our Nation's deep-seated commitment to equality for all under the law.
But the alternative that would force courts to explicitly consider the
underlying motivation and purpose behind these acts-the equal-protection doctrine-is likewise an imperfect vehicle as currently applied. Nonfederal legislation implicating undocumented immigrants receives only rational basis review, and there is certainly a rational basis for these laws: the
argument that state taxpayers are significantly burdened by the adverse social and fiscal impacts of illegal immigration is a valid purpose that would
inevitably withstand this minimal scrutiny. Because no current legal doctrine can adequately confront racial animus towards undocumented immigrants, courts have incorporated backdoor equal protection considerations
into preemption analysis. This approach is problematic because it further
obfuscates preemption jurisprudence in the immigration field and fails to
explicitly address an overriding issue-discrimination on the basis of race
and national origin.
All of the above issues were on full display in the Fifth Circuit case
Villas at Parkside v. City of Farmers Branch3 and the Third Circuit case,
Lozano v. City of Hazleton,4 both cases where the Supreme Court unfortunately denied certiorari. Both cases involved city ordinances that refused
housing to individuals unable to demonstrate lawful residence in the
United States. The Court missed an opportunity to clarify the boundaries
of preemption law, specifically in the immigration context, and more importantly to address the equal-protection concerns raised by local legislation directed at undocumented immigrants.
This Comment is broken into three sections. The first section explains
preemption law generally, examines preemption in the immigration field
specifically, and then focuses on three virtually identical city ordinances
arising in three different circuits-all analyzed under preemption principles-to identity the problems with using preemption jurisprudence in the
immigration arena. This section first concludes that use of the field preemption subset should be limited to situations either where local legislation
3. Id. at 526 (majority opinion).
4. 724 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 82 U.S.L.W. 3284 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2014) (No. 13-531).
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actually forces undocumented immigrants out of the U.S., or determines
the conditions under which they may remain. The analysis then argues that
the too flexible obstacle preemption subset should be abandoned in favor
of an equal protection analysis.
The second section traces the evolution of Fourteenth Amendment
equal-protection law, deconstructs its tiered-scrutiny-scheme, and examines
equal-protection cases in the immigration context. This section argues that
non-federal laws implicating undocumented aliens should be reviewed
under heightened scrutiny-an approach that allows for state involvement
while it also guards against unconstitutional discrimination-and argues
that to do so would be consistent with traditional justifications for elevated
scrutiny.
Section three synthesizes the preemption and equal-protection conclusions into a proposed model and concludes that if courts subjected these
legislations to intermediate scrutiny, they would reach the right answers for
the right reasons, unlike current use of the preemption doctrine in these
cases, an approach that allows courts to reach what arguably is the right
decision, but for the wrong reasons.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF PREEMPTION LAW

Tools Traditionally Available to the Federal Courts When
Performing Preemption Analysis

It is a fundamental constitutional principle that the Supremacy Clause
enables Congress to preempt state law.5 Federal law will preempt a state
or local regulation "when: (1) Congress expressly preempts state law; (2)
Congressional intent to preempt may be inferred from the existence of a
pervasive federal regulatory scheme; or (3) state law conflicts with federal
law or its purposes." 6 These approaches are applied to determine whether a
state law infringes too much into an area where Congress has acted.
1. Express Preemption
When a federal law contains an express preemption clause, the Supreme Court focuses "on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily
contains the best evidence of Congress' preemptive intent."7 For example,
the Court recently held that a clause in the Federal Meat Inspection Act
("FMIA") expressly preempted a California statute that attempted to force
slaughterhouses to euthanize animals more humanely.' The FMIA's preemption clause stipulated that states were powerless to impose requirements that were within the scope of the FMIA and related to a
slaughterhouse's "premises, facilities and operations," or were "in addition
5. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000).
6. Frank v. Delta Airlines Inc., 314 F.3d 195, 197 (5th Cir. 2002).
7. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993).
8. CAL. PENAL CODE § 599f (a)-(c) (West 2010).
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to, or different than those made under" the FMIA. 9 The majority held that
the FMIA clause expressly preempted the state legislation in question because, "at every turn, [the California meat inspection statute] imposed additional or different requirements on swine slaughterhouses .

.

. [and] in

essence, California's statute substitut[ed] a new regulatory scheme for" the
existing Federal plan.10 Express preemption is generally non-controversial
because it is easy to apply: if federal legislation includes an explicit preemption clause, states and localities are on clear notice not to enter the field.
2.

Field Preemption

Even where express preemption is inoperative, a pervasive federal regulatory scheme "may show that Congress intended to preempt the field,
leaving no room for the states to supplement it."" Intent can be inferred
from a framework of regulation "so pervasive .

.

. that Congress left no

room for the States to supplement it" and where a "federal interest is so
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement
of state laws on the same subject."'1 2 While the Court has, in limited circumstances, applied field pre-emption when a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme is in place, it has emphasized that "where... the field which
Congress is said to have pre-empted" includes areas that have "been traditionally occupied by the States, congressional intent to supersede state laws
must be clear and manifest."13
Field preemption has only been utilized in the immigration context on
two occasions. First, in Hines v. Davowitz, the Court held that a Pennsylvania regulation attempting to implement its own alien registration system, separate from the federal system, was field preempted. 4 The Court
reasoned that the "Constitution permits only one uniform national registration system" for immigration purposes. 5
Second, in Arizona v. United States, the Court examined four provisions of an Arizona statute known as S.B. 1070 and concluded that all but
one of the provisions were either field or conflict preempted. 6 Section 3 of
S.B. 1070 made it a misdemeanor for failing "to complete or carry an [Arizona] alien registration document."'1 7 The Court held that Section 3 was
field preempted, reasoning that alien registration is exclusively a Federal
prerogative.'" The Court stated, "if § 3 of the Arizona statute were valid,
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

21 U.S.C. § 678 (2012).
Nat'l Meat Ass'n. v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965, 970 (2012).
English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62 (1941).
Id. at 73.
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2494 (2012).
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 11-1509(A) (West Supp. 2011).
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2495.
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every State could give itself independent authority to prosecute federal registration violations," diminishing the Federal Government's "control over
registration determinations and enforcement." 9
The Court, however, has repeatedly refrained from finding field preemption where states have traditionally exercised police powers, and where
there is no express preemption.2' For example, the Arizona Court upheld
Section 2(B) of Arizona's law, which required state police officers to verify
legal immigration status of persons investigated for routine matters, such as
traffic stops, because it was a valid exercise of Arizona's police power.2 '
The Court has declined to apply field preemption in a plethora of other
situations, such as in employment standards for illegal immigrants, 22 regulations concerning the collection of blood, 3 warehouse regulations,24 minimum healthcare standards, 25 pollution,2 6 and professional licensing, 27 even
though, in all those situations, there were broad federal regulatory schemes
in place.
In sum, the Court applies field preemption narrowly-in immigration
cases only twice-and has stated that,
"to infer pre-emption whenever an agency deals with a
problem comprehensively is virtually tantamount to saying
that whenever a federal agency decides to step into a field,
its regulations will be exclusive. Such a rule, of course,
embodwould be inconsistent with the federal-state balance
' 28
jurisprudence.
Clause
Supremacy
our
in
ied
19. Id. at 2502 (quoting Wis. Dep't of Indus. v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 288-289 (1986)).
20. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992) (holding that Federal regulation of
cigarette warning labels should be construed narrowly and that the Federal regulation did not field
preempt because the states were acting within their police powers by regulating commerce related to
tobacco).
21. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2509.
22. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976) (holding that California's prohibition on employing illegal immigrants was not preempted by federal law because it was "certainly within the mainstream of such police power regulation").
23. Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985) (holding that
FDA does not preempt local regulations on plasma collection because "the regulation of health and
safety matters is primarily, and historically, a matter of local concern").
24. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 247 (1947) (holding that warehouse regulation
was a "deeply rooted State" objective and that States could supplement and enforce the Federal
scheme).
25. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 758 (1985) (holding that ERISA does not preempt state efforts to implement policies concerning mental healthcare because the state regulation "was
a valid and unexceptional exercise of the Commonwealth's police power").
26. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 446 (1960) (holding that "it is
the primary responsibility of State and local governments to prevent air pollution," even though there is
already a substantial federal scheme in place).
27. Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S.Ct. 1968 (2011) (holding that professional
licensing is not preempted by IRCA and noting that States "possess broad authority under their police
powers to regulate the employment relationship to protect workers within the State").
28. Hillsborough Cnty., 471 U.S. at 717.
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Conflict Preemption and Its Subsets

In the absence of express or field preemption, conflict preemption may
still be used to invalidate a state law. Conflict preemption is invoked in
two situations. First, it is raised when compliance with both state and federal law is impossible.29 For example, in Boggs v. Boggs, the Court held
that a Louisiana law was conflict preempted because it directly conflicted30
with the Employment Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA.")
Louisiana's community property law allowed a testator's first wife to transfer her interest in an estate in a manner that would circumvent a second
wife's survivorship share, a provision that rendered compliance with both
the Louisiana law and the Congressional scheme set forth in ERISA
impossible.31
Second, conflict preemption may be operative where a state law conflicts with the "full purposes and objective of Congress."32 This is commonly referred to as "obstacle preemption. '3 3 In Geier v. American Honda
Motor Company, the Court examined a United States Department of
Transportation regulation and held that state tort law claims relating to air
bag safety devices were conflict preempted because such claims posed a
substantial "obstacle to the accomplishment" of Congressional objectives.34
Although the state claim and the federal regulation were not in direct conflict, the Court determined conflict preemption applied where the looming
possibility that a state law tort claim would impose greater liability on car
manufacturers than Congress contemplated.35
Conflict preemption, however, is not applied mechanically simply because there is tension between state and federal law. 36 The Court has repeatedly held that "where possible, provisions of a statute should be read
so as not to create a conflict."' 37 Thus, in LouisianaPublic Service Commission v. FCC, the Court noted that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had broad authority to develop and regulate "interstate and
foreign commerce in wire and radio communication," but nonetheless held
that the states were authorized to the regulate rates concerning wire and
radio communications. 38 The Court so held, even though there would inevitably be "tension between state and federal law."' 39 Further, the Court has
noted that conflict preemption is not invoked simply because the Federal
29. Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 841 (1997) (this has been referred to as "direct conflict").
30. Id.
31. Id. at 844.
32. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000).
33. Id.
34. Geier, 529 U.S. at 866.
35. Id. at 885.
36. Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kan., 489 U.S. 493, 515 (1989) (finding
no conflict preemption where state regulations concerning natural gas were in tension with Federal
regulations).
37. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. F.C.C., 476 U.S. 355, 370 (1986) (citing Wash. Mkt. Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112 (1879)).
38. La. Public Service, 476 U.S. at 378.
39. Id.
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government "thinks [its plan] will best effectuate a federal policy."4 The
Court has also refused to preempt state law, even when it is contrary to
subsidiary federal objectives concerning administration, if the state law furthers the federal statute's primary purpose and the law is within an area
traditionally regulated by States. 4
4.

Presumption Against Preemption

There is a presumption against preemption "[iun all pre-emption cases,
and particularly [where] ...Congress has legislated.. . in a field which the
States have traditionally occupied. ' 42 This presumption serves purposes of
federalism because where Congress acts in a field traditionally occupied by
the States, the Court should defer to the "historic police powers of the
States" and refrain from applying preemption "unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress. '43 The presumption against preemp-4
'4
tion emerged out of "respect for the states as independent sovereigns.
Thus, in DeCanas v. Bica, the Court invoked the presumption against preemption and held that a California statute controlling employment standards for illegal immigrants was not preempted, reasoning that states
"possess broad authority under their police powers to regulate the employ'45
ment relationship to protect workers within the State.
B.

Preemption and the Regulation of Immigration Today

1. What is a "Regulation of Immigration?"
Congress has the plenary power to regulate immigration.4 6 However,
what constitutes a "regulation of immigration" has been interpreted narrowly;47 the DeCanas Court stated that a "regulation of immigration is...
essentially a determination of who should or should not be admitted into
the country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain. "48
In DeCanas, the Court held that even if local regulation has an "indirect
impact on immigration, it does not thereby become an unconstitutional
regulation of immigration . . .[and] absent congressional action [a state
regulation] is not an invalid state incursion on federal power."4 9
State regulations determined to be direct regulations of immigration5 °
are automatically field preempted and the presumption against preemption
40. Id. at 374.
41. Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 505-06 (1987).
42. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 564 (2009).
43. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
44. Wyeth, 129 S.Ct. at 1195 n.3.
45. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976).
46. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893) (holding that the power to exclude
and admit aliens is an inherent power of the federal government).
47. See also infra notes 211-16 and accompanying text.
48. DeCanas,424 U.S. at 355.
49. Id. at 356.
50. According to DeCanas,a regulation of immigration is essentially a determination of who can
and cannot be legally in the United States and the conditions under which they may remain. See id. at
355.
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is either inapplicable or overcome.51 On the other hand, when state legislation indirectly involves the regulation of immigration, the presumption
against preemption is operative and unless express or conflict preemption
is found, the regulation will not be field preempted. 2 Accordingly, when a
state regulation implicates immigration, the primary question is whether
the legislation directly or indirectly touches immigration. 3
2.

Congressional Support for Federal, State, and Local Cooperation in
Immigration Matters

In the last twenty years, Congress has announced a more cooperative,
state/federal approach for immigration enforcement. First, in 1996, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act
(IIRRA), which provided an avenue for state/federal cooperation through
the 287(g) program.54 That provision authorizes the "secretary of DHS to
enter into agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies, permitting designated officers to perform immigration law enforcement functions, provided that the local law enforcement officers receive appropriate
training under the supervision of ICE officers." 55
Second, Congressional intent to allow states a greater degree of immigration power can be inferred from 8 U.S.C. § 1644, which provides in relevant part that "notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or
local law, no State or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any
way restricted, from sending to or receiving information regarding the im56
migration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United States.
Soon after the passage of § 1644, Congress enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1373, a statute which requires the federal government to respond to non-federal requests concerning an individual's immigration status.57
3.

Divergent Application of Arizona and Whiting

The Court's two most recent immigration rulings, both decided on preemption grounds, are Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting and U.S. v. Arizona. Although both cases have already been mentioned, a further
examination is necessary because of their inconsistent application in the
federal circuits. In Whiting, the Court examined an Arizona employment
law, which allowed the state to revoke business licenses of employers who
employed unauthorized aliens.58 The law also required employers to verify
51. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502 (2012) (holding that state attempts to enforce
Federal immigration registration program was a regulation of immigration and thus field preempted,
though the presumption against preemption apparently applied).
52. Id.
53. Lauren Gilbert, Immigrant Laws, Obstacle Preemption and the Lost Legacy of Mcculloch, 33
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 184 (2012).
54. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1)-(9) (2012).
55. U.S. Dep't of Immigration, Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g)
Immigration and Nationality Act, http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g.htm#moa.
56. 8 U.S.C. § 1644 (2012).
57. 8 U.S.C. §1373(a)-(b) (2012).
58. Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973 (2011).
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the employment eligibility of hired employees through the federal E-Verify
system.59 The federal government argued for obstacle preemption on
grounds that there is a need for "uniformity in immigration law enforcement," and that if the Arizona law were allowed, there would be inconsistent application of federal policy regarding non-citizen employment. 60 The
Court rejected these arguments, reasoning that the obstacle "preemption
analysis does not justify a 'freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a
state statute is in tension with federal objectives'; such an endeavor 'would
undercut the principle that it is Congress rather than the courts that
61
preempts state law."'
One year after its Whiting decision, the Court held that conflict preemption invalidated a similar Arizona law. The legislation in question, S.B.
1070, made it a misdemeanor for undocumented aliens to seek work in
Arizona and allowed state officials to make arrests predicated on federal
immigration offenses. 62 The legislation also included employment sanctions against potential employees, and the Court distinguished from Whiting, which imposed sanctions on the employer rather than the employee.
The Arizona Court found conflict preemption because the Immigration
Reform and Control Act ( "IRCA") underscored the fact that Congress
made a deliberate choice not to impose criminal penalties on aliens who
seek, or engage in, unauthorized employment. '63 The Court conflict-preempted the enforcement provisions on grounds that there was potential
that illegal aliens would be arrested by state officials for conduct that would
not be punished by federal officials.6 4 This, the Court reasoned, created a
conflict with the "federal direction and supervision" of immigration law.65
Application of Whiting and Arizona among the circuits has been contradictory. For example, the Eighth Circuit, in Keller v. City of Fremont,
restricted the reasoning from Arizona, expanded the rationale from Whiting, and refrained from preempting a local housing ordinance directed at
undocumented aliens.66 In contrast, the Third Circuit in City of Hazleton,
and the Fifth Circuit in City of FarmersBranch, expanded Arizona's underpinnings and restricted Whiting's holding to preempt what was essentially
67
the same law examined by the Eighth Circuit in City of Fremont.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1979.
61. Id. at 1985 (citing Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
62. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2503 (2012).
63. Id. at 2504.
64. Id. at 2506.
65. Id. at 2509.
66. See Keller v. City of Fremont, 719 F.3d 931, 944 (8th Cir. 2013) (relying on Whiting and
holding that, like the law in Whiting, the local housing ordinance was not conflict-preempted because
the ordinance's "provisions would only indirectly effect the removal of any alien from the City").
67. See Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d 524, 532 (5th Cir. 2013)
(en banc) (distinguishing from Whiting, finding preemption because, unlike the law upheld in Whiting,
the law in question applied only "to individuals whom the Federal Government has already declared
cannot work in this country," which created potential that state application of federal law would conflict with federal policy); Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297, 317 (3d Cir. 2013) (same).
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C. Preemption Analysis as Applied in Three Circuit Courts
Over the past fifteen years, there have been unprecedented amounts
of local legislation targeting illegal immigration.68 Recently, federal courts
confronting these laws have uniformly applied preemption principles, but
application of the doctrine has radically differed between the circuits.69
This section focuses on three virtually identical housing ordinances arising
in three separate circuits to illustrate the divergent approaches courts take
when dealing with essentially the same issues.
The Third Circuit adopted a broad field preemption approach and
struck the ordinance."y The Fifth Circuit also struck the ordinance, but
elected the conflict preemption path, specifically its obstacle preemption
subset.7 ' The Eighth Circuit, like the Fifth Circuit, elected the conflict preemption approach, but unlike the Fifth Circuit, applied the direct conflict
subset and upheld the ordinance. 2
1. The Three Ordinances
Citing concerns with the negative impacts of illegal immigration, the
towns of Hazleton in the state of Pennsylvania, Fremont, Missouri, and
Farmers Branch, Texas, all enacted housing ordinances that required residents seeking to rent or lease housing in their respective towns to apply
for residential occupancy licenses.73 These ordinances were substantially
identical, not surprising since they were all drafted by the same person.7 4
The ordinances required applicants to provide identification proving
legal presence in the United States.75 If an individual was unable to produce valid identification and still wished to rent, a city official would issue a
temporary license while awaiting verification from federal government regarding the individual's immigration status.76 The inspector revoked the
license of any alien determined to be in the country illegally.77 When the
federal government was unable to verify the applicant's status, the official
68. See Jason H. Lee, Unlawful Status As A "Constitutional Irrelevancy"?: The Equal Protection
Rights of Illegal Immigrants, 39 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 1, 3 (2008) (discussing recent anti-immigrant
legislation).
69. See, e.g., City of Fremont, 719 F.3d 931 (analyzed under conflict preemption); Chamber of
Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011); City of Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d 524 (analyzed
under both field and conflict preemption principles); Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012)
(same); City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297 (same); Cent. Ala. Fair Housing Ctr. v. Magee, 835 F. Supp. 2d
1165 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (analyzed under field preemption principles).
70. City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d at 315.
71. City of Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d at 527.
72. City of Fremont,719 F.3d at 945.
73. City of Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d at 526-28; City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d at 301-03; City of
Fremont, 719 F.3d at 937-38.
74. Kris Kobach, Kansas' Secretary of State and former Constitutional law Professor at the University of Missouri-Kansas City.
75. City of Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d at 528; City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d at 302; City of Fremont,
719 F.3d at 738.
76. City of Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d at 527; City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d at 302; City of Fremont,
719 F.3d at 738.
77. City of Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d at 526; City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d at 301; City of Fremont,
719 F.3d at 739.
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had the option of taking the applicant's word that he was in the country
legally, or to refuse to issue a license.78 Under the enforcement provisions
of these ordinances, lessors who knowingly permitted persons without a
valid license to occupy rental housing were subject to criminal sanctions
and fined at varying amounts.79
The cities did not deny these ordinances were meant to restrict illegal
aliens from obtaining housing; they simply contended their power was authorized pursuant to their policing powers."0 All of the ordinances deferred absolutely to the federal immigration scheme and contained
severability clauses.8 ' The substance of these clauses stated that the laws
must "be implemented in a manner fully consistent with federal law regulating immigration" and that if any portion of the law were "held invalid or
unconstitutional" that the remaining portions would remain "legally en82
forceable without the invalid portion.

2.

At One End of the Spectrum: Lozano v. City of Hazleton

In Lozano v. City of Hazleton, the Third Circuit examined the housing
ordinance 3 and unanimously held that it was field preempted. 4 The Third
Circuit stated that Congress, in promulgating the INA, had "expressed
more than a 'peripheral concern' with the entry, movement, and residence
of aliens within the United States and the breadth of these laws illustrates
an overwhelmingly dominant federal interest in the field."85 The court focused on the DeCanas regulation of immigration standard (i.e. a determination of "who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the
conditions under which a legal entrant may remain"), 6 and determined
that the ordinance impermissibly entered the immigration field because it
both attempted to regulate who was admitted into the country and in effect
controlled the conditions under which aliens could stay. 7
In finding that the ordinance attempted to regulate alien admission
policy, the court noted that the ordinance did "not control actual physical
entry into, or expulsion from, Hazleton or the United States," but determined that "in essence, that is precisely what the [ordinance] attempt[ed]
78. City of FarmersBranch, 726 F.3d at 528; City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d at 302; City of Fremont,
719 F.3d at 738.
79. City of FarmersBranch, 726 F.3d at 527; City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d at 302; City of Fremont,
719 F.3d at 738.
80. City of FarmersBranch, 726 F.3d at 528; City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d at 302; City of Fremont,
719 F.3d at 738.
81. City of Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d at 528; City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d at 302; City of Fremont,
719 F.3d at 738.
82. City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d at 336.
83. The ordinance also included employment provisions, the analysis of which is beyond the
scope of this Comment.
84. Id. at 301.
85. Id. at 316 (citing Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Governor of Ga., 691 F.3d 1250,
1263-65 (11th Cir. 2012)).
86. Id. at 315 (quoting DeCanas,424 U.S. at 355).
87. Id.
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to do.""8 Further, the court reasoned that the ordinance also "attempted to
regulate residence based solely on immigration status," which in their opinion intruded into the INA's sole authority to regulate noncitizen residency
requirements. 89 The city argued that the law was simply a housing ordinance that attempted to control rental standards, authorized under state
police power; the court rejected this contention, holding that the ordinance
was "nothing more than a thinly veiled attempt to regulate residency under
the guise of a regulation of rental housing." 9°
The Third Circuit, although unnecessary because of its field preemption ruling, also held that the housing provisions were obstacle preempted
because they interfered "with the federal government's discretion in, and
control over, the removal process."91 The court recognized that the ordinance made absolute deferral to federal determination of immigration status, but focused on the impending conflict the ordinance posed to the
"Executive Branch's enforcement and [immigration] policy priorities."92
3.

At the Other End: Keller v. City of Fremont

In contrast to City of Hazleton, the Eighth Circuit, in Keller v. City of
Fremont, dealt with a virtually identical ordinance and unanimously held
that it was neither field nor conflict preempted. 93 The plaintiffs argued for
field preemption on grounds that the ordinance would in effect remove
noncitizens from the U.S., which equated it to a "regulation of immigration."94 The Eighth Circuit observed the same "regulation of immigration"
standard as did the Third Circuit but came to the opposite result; the court
reasoned that there was no evidence on record "that aliens denied occupancy licenses in the City [would] leave the country, as opposed to obtaining other housing in the City, renting outside the City, or relocating to
other parts of the country."95 The court also rejected additional arguments
for field preemption.96
88. Id. at 315-16.
89. Id. at 315 (emphasis in original).
90. Id. at 315.
91. Id. at 317.
92. Id. at 318.
93. City of Fremont,719 F.3d at 941, 944.
94. Id. at 941.
95. Id.
96. The court held that the ordinances' rental license system was not an "alien registration" system comparable to the registration schemes which were field-preempted in Arizona and Hines. Id. at
943 (stating that to equate the licensing scheme to an alien registration system "would mean that any
time a State collects basic information from its residents, including aliens-such as before issuing
driver's licenses-it impermissibly intrudes into the field of alien registration and must be preempted").
The court also rejected the argument that the ordinance's enforcement provisions relating to harboring
were field preempted, reasoning "that the federal interest [in harboring law] was not so dominant that
...it preclude[d] enforcement of state laws on the same subject." Id. (citing Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at
2501).
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Because the Eighth Circuit rejected the field preemption approach, it
necessarily determined that conflict preemption "was the crux of the preemption issue."9 7 The court unanimously held that there was no conflict
between the ordinance and federal law.98 The thrust of the plaintiff's obstacle preemption argument was that the ordinance would force aliens from
one jurisdiction to another, which would interfere with "a principal feature
of the federal removal system, the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials to determine which aliens who are not legally present in the
United States should be removed from the country."99 Although the court
recognized this potential for conflict with federal immigration policy, they
found the argument unpersuasive because the explicit terms of the ordinance dictated that local officials must defer absolutely to the federal determination of immigration status. 100 In essence, the Eighth Circuit
determined mere potential for conflict was insufficient to preempt.' 0 '
4.

In the Middle and a Microcosm of the Circuit's Uncertainties: Villas
at Parkside v. Farmers Branch

The City of Farmers Branch case is especially important because the
fractured en banc court's 125-page opinion 10 2 reveals that the preemption
doctrine, when applied to local legislation targeting undocumented aliens,
leads to divergent and unprincipled results. In a sense, the case is a microcosm of the circuits' uncertainty on the issue, showing how, under the
broad and unclear preemption doctrine, courts can apply field preemption,
obstacle preemption, or a traditional direct conflict test to reach inconsistent decisions. The majority applied obstacle preemption and chose to preempt the ordinance. One concurrence agreed that the ordinance should be
preempted, but was of the opinion that field preemption principles controlled. Another concurrence blended elements of field preemption and
obstacle preemption and likewise concluded that the ordinance should be
preempted. The dissent determined, under what appeared to be a direct
conflict test, that there was no actual conflict with federal law and accordingly opined that the ordinance should not be preempted.
The majority ultimately preempted three aspects' 0 3 of the ordinance,
reasoning that those portions posed an obstacle to "'the accomplishment
97. Id. at 944.
98. Id. at 945.
99. Id. at 943-44.
100. Id. at 945.
101. Id. (stating that "'we decline to speculate whether the rental provisions might, as applied,
'stand[ ] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress"') (citing Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510).
102. Eight votes constitute a majority on the 5th Circuit's fifteen judge court of appeals. The
majority opinion garnered ten votes. Two judges concurred in result only. Five judges wrote separate
concurrences. Five judges dissented.
103. The three preempted aspects included (1) the criminal harboring provisions, (2) the enforcement provisions, and (3) the judicial review section. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers
Branch, 726 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc). Regarding the criminal harboring provisions, the
majority held that they were obstacle preempted because they potentially imposed broader liability
than the federal harboring provisions, for example the Farmer's Branch ordinance, in contrast to the
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and execution of the full purposes and objectives' of Congress. '"104 After

examining the purpose and extent of the ordinance, the majority concluded
that the ordinance's severability clause was unenforceable and thus struck
the ordinance in full.1" 5 In finding obstacle preemption, the majority focused on the fact that the ordinance potentially criminalized behavior that
federal law did not; the majority also found obstacle preemption because
the ordinance created the potential for "conflicting state and federal rulings" regarding the legality of a non-citizen's presence in the United
States. 6
The reasoning underpinning the two concurrences was virtually identical in form, although one was identified as a field preemption analysis and
the other was labeled as an obstacle preemption analysis. The core of the
field preemption concurrence focused on the fact that the effect and purpose of the ordinance was "the exclusion of Latinos from the city of Farmers Branch."'0 7 After considering the federal government's pervasive
immigration scheme, this concurrence concluded this exclusionary power
was solely federal, that the ordinance was tantamount to a regulation of
immigration, and therefore
surmised that the ordinance should have been
10 8
field preempted.
The obstacle preemption concurrence weaved together traditional
field preemption language and tenets but ultimately characterized it simply
as an obstacle preemption analysis.' 0 9 This concurrence tracked the majority opinion closely but, unlike the majority, which held that only three of
the ordinances provisions were obstacle preempted, concluded that the ordinance was preempted in "all its core provisions" because of the all-encompassing federal immigration scheme." 0
The dissent determined that a direct conflict test should apply and,
under that test, decided that the ordinance should not have been preempted in any regard."' Highlighting the fact that the ordinance deferred
absolutely to the federal determination of immigration status, the dissent
5th Circuit's interpretation of "harboring," potentially criminalized behavior absent a showing of deliberate intent to harbor. Id. at 530. The majority reasoned that this provision was conflict preempted
because it enabled state officials to essentially act as "immigration officers" and punish behavior that
federal policy [did] not. Id. at 531-30. The enforcement provisions relating to non-citizens were preempted on similar grounds. Id. at 531-36. The Ordinance potentially criminalized behavior-the inability to obtain a housing permit-that federal law does not. Id. at 532. The majority reasoned that
this posed an obstacle to federal immigration policy as the enforcement provisions placed "local officials in the impermissible position of arresting and detaining persons based on their immigration status
without federal direction and supervision." Id. at 532 (quoting Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2505). Concerning the judicial review sections, the majority held that they were obstacle preempted because they
created potential for "conflicting state and federal rulings" regarding the legality of a non-citizen's
presence in the United States. Id. at 536.
104. Id. at 529 (citing Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000)).
105. Id. at 538.
106. Id. at 536.
107. Id. at 539.
108. Id. at 543.
109. Judge Dennis' concurrence was joined by judges Prado, Graves, and Reavely.
110. Id. at 544.
111. Id. at 562.
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was of the opinion that there could not possibly be a direct conflict with
federal law and that the potential for conflict in application was insufficient
to preempt.'1 2 The dissent also focused on conceptions of federalism and
determined that, because the ordinance implicated matters traditionally
within the states' police powers, it was "entitled to a strong presumption of
constitutionality," which the majority and concurrences failed to do." 3
III.

A

CALL TO CURTAIL USE OF PREEMPTION IN LOCAL,

IMMIGRATION RELATED LEGISLATION

A.

Preempting Common Sense: The Problems with
Misapplication of Field Preemption

To say that the federal government occupies the field of immigration is
merely to state the obvious. To say that the field of immigration includes
all matters tangentially implicating immigration matters, on the other hand,
is highly debatable. Nonetheless, courts have expanded traditional understandings of field preemption to strike down laws marginally associated
with immigration.
Such a broad reading of field preemption is unprecedented and effectively precludes a balancing of federal and state interests, precludes an honest evaluation of the problems facing states and localities, precludes
meaningful scrutiny of the efficacy of federal regulation-in short, it prevents a common sense approach to a complicated issue. When courts elect
field preemption of local immigration related legislation, they in effect prioritize the potential for misapplication of federal policy over the real and
present problems localities face. Further, because the analysis does not require it, use of the field preemption doctrine will rarely involve meaningful
inquiry into discriminatory intent behind much of this local legislation.
This Section explains how field preemption is being misapplied, then explores the problems this misapplication creates.
1. Doctrinal Meanderings: Recent Field Preemption Decisions
Erroneously Equate Indirect Regulations of Immigration to
Direct Regulations
For field preemption to apply, a court must first determine that the
legislation in question is a direct regulation of immigration. A "regulation
of immigration" has been narrowly defined as "a determination of who
should or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions
under which a legal entrant may remain."1 1 4 A troubling trend has begun
whereby courts are making extraordinary leaps of logic, stretching this definition to include laws that potentially force illegal aliens out of a city or
112. Id. at 573.
113. Id. at 566.
114. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976)
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state, but not out of the United States. 115 This approach ignores Supreme
Court precedent and fails to consider its negative and far reaching
consequences.
In 120 years of modern immigration regulation, field preemption has
been used only twice to invalidate local, immigration related laws." 6 In
both cases, the Court field preempted local legislation that directly attempted to regulate immigration." 7 The Court has repeatedly confronted
legislation that potentially forces illegal aliens out of a city or state, but
consistently holds that field preemption principles do not apply. For example, in Whiting, the Court upheld an Arizona law revoking business licenses
for those who employed illegal aliens." 8 The employee verification system
in Whiting would effectively drive illegal aliens from one location to another. Additionally, in DeCanas, California's employer sanction program-which was not preempted by the Court-unquestionably drove
illegal aliens out of California.
Further, to say that any legislation related to illegal immigrants is field
preempted would mean that traditional state police powers in any area
touching immigration would be held invalid if the courts were consistent in
their holdings. Considering the large numbers of illegal immigrants in the
United States today, many local laws will indirectly impact illegal aliens,
especially in communities where there are significantly higher numbers of
undocumented immigrants. A broad field preemption approach will leave
states absolutely dependent on federal immigration enforcement, which
has been and continues to be inadequate.
Application of field preemption to indirect regulations essentially
brings a principle of law into play with factual circumstances to which it is
clearly not appropriate, and the result is confusion for the whole area of
preemption jurisprudence. Courts have departed from well-settled field
preemption precedent, concluding that laws indirectly implicating immigration are to be regarded the same as if they were direct regulations of immigration. Such rulings lack credibility because they are not logical-the
reasoning behind those opinions leads to the inescapable conclusion that
local laws which simply create disincentives for illegal immigrants to reside
in a community will in fact literally force those individuals out of the country. Because such a broad reading of the doctrine is unreasonable, it invites
discriminatory actors to object from a logically superior position, and could
somewhat ironically provide a cover for covert discriminatory intent.

115. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297, 316 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that a city housing
ordinance was field preempted, because "in essence" it attempted to remove persons from the United
States).
116. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012)
117. In both Hines and Arizona, the legislation in question was a state sanctioned immigrant registration system.
118. Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1987 (2011).
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Obvious Problems with Completely Precluding Local Involvement in
Immigration Matters

There is a real need for localities to protect themselves-of course, in
a nondiscriminatory manner-from the adverse effects of illegal immigration. Enforcing the immigration law is "one of the most daunting chal'
lenges faced by the federal government."119
Blindly applying field
preemption to local laws implicating illegal aliens eliminates the potential
for much needed non-federal assistance with the Nation's immigration
ordeal. Under conservative estimates, there are approximately 11.9 million
illegal aliens present in the U.S. today. 2 ° ICE is the federal agency primarily responsible for addressing illegal immigration.' 2 ' ICE employs 20,000
persons, who face the overwhelming tasks of guarding 7,458 miles of U.S.
border, 2 2 attempting to apprehend and remove approximately 11.9 million
illegal aliens, 23 and overseeing "criminal and civil enforcement of federal
24
laws governing ... customs, trade, and immigration," to name a few.'
Though the federal government has done a better job of addressing certain
aspects of illegal immigration than in years past, 125 the majority of the
problems related to illegal immigration persist.
The costs associated with illegal immigration are staggering. A recent
study estimates the "cost to American taxpayers of harboring illegal immigrants in the United States is $113 billion a year"-an average of $1,117 for
every household in America.126 However, some academics argue persuasively that illegal aliens "actually contribute more to public coffers in taxes
than they cost in social services.' 27 These arguments universally concede
119. Kris W. Kobach, The QuintessentialForce Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local Police
to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 180 (2006).
120. Jeffrey S. Passel & D'Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Population:National and State
Trends, 2010, PEW RESEARCH HISPANIC TRENDS PROJECT (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.pewhispanic.org/

2011/02/01/unauthorized-immigrant-population-brnational-and-state-trends-2010/.
121. "ICE's primary mission is to promote homeland security and public safety through the criminal and civil enforcement of federal laws governing border control, customs, trade and immigration."
About ICE: Overview, Mission, ICE.GOV, http://www.ice.gov/about/overview/ (last visited Mar. 29,
2014).
122. CRS Report for Congress, U.S. International Borders: Brief Facts (Nov. 9, 2006), http://www.
fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21729.pdf (stating that the Boundary line of the U.S.-Canadian border, excluding Alaska, is approximately 3,987 miles; U.S.-Mexican border is estimated at 1,933 miles; AlaskaCanada border is 1,538 miles, together totaling 7,458 miles).
123. IMMIGRATION FACTS, http://www.fairus.org/states/united-states (last visited Mar. 29, 2014).
124. About ICE: Overview, ICE.GOV, http://www.ice.gov/about/overview/ (last visited Mar. 29,
2014).
125. For example, ICE has recently increased its crime related removals. See generally News Release, ICE, FY 2012: ICE Announces Year-End Removal Numbers, Highlights Focus on Key Priorities
and Issues New National Detainer Guidance to Further Focus Resources (Dec. 21, 2012), http://www.
ice.gov/news/releases/1212/121221washingtondc2.htm (noting that fifty-five percent of persons removed
in 2012 (225,390 of the 409,849) were convicted of felonies or misdemeanors-almost double the removal of criminals in FY 2008).
126. Illegal Immigration-The $113 Billion Dollar Drain on the American Taxpayer, ILLEGAL
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, http://www.illegalimmigrationstatistics.org/illegal-immigration-a-113-billiona-year-drain-on-u-s-taxpayers/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2014).
127. Francine J. Lipman, The Taxation of Undocumented Immigrants: Separate, Unequal, and
Without Representation, 9 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 2-4 (2006) (quoting Peter L. Reich, Public Benefits

for Undocumented Aliens: State Law Into the Breach Once More, 21 N.M. L. REV. 219, 243 (1991)).
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that illegal immigration burdens American taxpayers with billions of dollars in social services but claim that the cost is more than offset by income
derived from
the property, corporate, and sales taxes paid by illegal
128
immigrants.
It is widely believed, however, that illegal aliens often work in the "underground economy where they pay no taxes on their earnings. ' 129 Further, another study estimates that "an average low-skilled immigrant
household costs federal, local, and state governments $19,588 per year
more than it pays in all taxes."'13 That study took every possible tax collection method into account, including but not limited to "sales tax, the
purchase1 of lottery tickets, user fees, corporate taxes, and property
taxes.

13

Additionally, the adverse impact of illegal immigration on local employment levels is evident. Illegal aliens fill millions of United States jobs
each year. The fact that there are less employment opportunities, regardless of the fact that some of these vanishing jobs are in sectors that United
States citizens prefer not to work in, is especially disconcerting considering
that the United States economy is suffering from a "massive downturn,"
resulting in the highest unemployment levels for legal United States residents in modern history.' 32 Moreover, communities with high numbers of
illegal immigrants are saddled with an exponential problem: many local
jobs are funneled to illegal aliens while they also absorb the substantial
social costs related to illegal immigration. For example, Arizona spent "approximately 2.7 billion dollars in 2009 to cover the cost of incarceration,
33
education, health, and welfare benefits supplied to illegal immigrants.'1
Though the actual economic burden to taxpayers may not be entirely
clear, the adverse and disproportionate social impacts of illegal immigration shouldered by localities are apparent. First, increasing amounts of
crime are attributed to illegal aliens. The negative impacts of rising crime
rates manifests locally. Approximately 250,000 illegal aliens were removed
in 2012 due to felony or misdemeanor convictions, which is double the

128. Robert Gittelson, The Centrists Against the Ideologues: What Are the FalsehoodsThat Divide
Americans on the Issue of Comprehensive Immigration Reform?, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 115, 122 (2009).
129. Randall G. Shelley, Jr., If You Want Something Done Right... : Chicanos Por La Causa v.
Napolitano and the Return of Federalism to Immigration Law, 43 AKRON L. REV. 603, 639 (2010).
130. Tax Cost of Each Low-Skilled Immigrant Household, NUMBERSUSA, https://www.numbers
usa.org/pages/tax-cost-each-low-skilled-immigrant-household (last visited Mar. 29, 2014) (emphasis
added).
131. Id.
132. Brittney M. Lane, Testing the Borders: The Boundaries of State and Local Power to Regulate
Illegal Immigration, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 483, 486 (2012).
133. Ed Barnes, Cost of Illegal Immigration Rising Rapidly in Arizona, Study Finds, Fox NEWS
(May 17, 2010), http://www.foxnews.comlus/2010/05/17/immigration-costs-rising-rapidlty-new-studysays/.
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amount of criminal aliens removed in 2008.3 This uptick is of course partially attributed to the Obama administration's "crime-based" removal policy. 135 However, the ongoing drug war in Mexico has inevitably been a
driving factor as well: 76,612 drug-related removals were made in 2012,
substantially more than in years past. 13 6 In 2012, 1,215 removals were
predicated on a homicide. 37 The overwhelming majority of these drug and
violent crime-related removals occurred in states bordering Mexico.' 38 Localities inevitably bear the negative impacts of increased crime rates, including but not limited to decreasing property values and increasing law
enforcement costs.
Considering these numbers, it is not surprising that many states and
municipalities cite crime as a driving factor behind their anti-illegal alien
regulations. The controversial Arizona Bill, S.B. 1070, was in large part a
reaction to a murder on the border, where the suspects allegedly escaped to
Mexico. 139 Hazleton, Pennsylvania, enacted its ordinance in response to
"rising crime rates" and an unprecedented string of murders.' 40 Farmers
Branch, Texas identified crime and plummeting property values as the
foundational issues underlying its ordinance.' 4'
3. The Problems Will Likely Continue
Another adverse social effect is caused in part by the polarized political atmosphere between local and federal government. A few isolated
states 142 absorb the brunt of illegal immigration and, because they are in
the pronounced minority, are unable to successfully seek adequate redress
through the national political process. Citizens of these states are becoming increasingly disenfranchised. While issues aside from lax federal immigration enforcement have contributed, it is notable that Texas, home of the
134. News Release, ICE, supra note 125.
135. See generally Michael J. Larson, The Right U.S. Immigration Enforcement Solution: "Make
Haste Slowly", 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 807, 809 (2012) (providing an in-depth analysis of the Obama
Administration's policy to primarily target criminal illegal aliens and potential terrorists); About ICE:
Enforcement and Removal Operations, ICE.Gov, http://www.ice.gov/aboutloffices/enforcement-remov
al-operations/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2014) (stating ICE "prioritizes the apprehension, arrest and removal
of convicted criminals, those who pose a threat to national security, fugitives and recent border
entrants").
136. Larson, supra note 135, at 809.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See generally Andrea Christina Nill, Latinos and S.B. 1070: Demonization, Dehumanization,
and Disenfranchisement,14 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 35, 41 (2011) (explaining that S.B. 1070 was passed
in reaction to a murder of a prominent farmer on the Arizona-Mexico border).
140. See generally Lane, supra note 132, at 486 (explaining the reasons for the Hazleton, Pennsylvania, ordinance).
141. See generally Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 496 F. Supp. 2d 757, 777
(N.D. Tex. 2007) (stating that the "anti-illegal immigrant" ordinance was passed because the city council "saw crime rising and property values declining").
142. For example, approximately two-thirds of illegal aliens living in the U reside in just five
states: California (2,635,000), Texas (1,810,000), Florida (820,000), New York (750,000), and Arizona
(390,000). IMMIGRATION FACTS, supra note 123.
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Farmers Branch ordinance and the nation's second largest illegal alien population, has over 125,000 signatures on a petition to secede. 143 Other states
leading the secession ballots are either close to
the Mexico border or are
144
significantly burdened by illegal immigration.
This polarization, alongside other related problems, will likely continue because non-federal entities are disproportionately burdened by illegal immigration while the federal government reaps the bulk of the
associated rewards. Peter Schuck, a leading scholar on immigration reform, asserts that the negative fiscal impacts of illegal immigration are exaggerated. 45 In fact, he claims that the presence of illegal aliens confers
substantial benefits to the U.S. economy.146 However, Schuck concludes
"that those benefits are distributed unevenly between the two levels of government."'1 47 Schuck describes a "fiscal mismatch under which most tax
revenues generated by immigrants flow to Washington... while almost all
of the costs ... are borne locally."' 48
Some estimates conclude that illegal immigration costs state and local
government over $84 billion per year while illegal aliens cost the federal
government $29 billion.' 49 Additionally, the federal government recoups
much, if not more than its related costs while states do not. For example, it
is estimated that "unauthorized immigrants pay $7 billion into Medicare
and Social Security funds each year (an exclusively federal system), most of
which they never claim."' 50 The reality of the disproportionate state burden contrasted with an uneven federal benefit suggests that the federal
government's lackadaisical approach will persist.
4.

Field Preemption Also Fails to Consider Discriminatory Animus

Preemption jurisprudence, standing alone, fails to inquire into critically significant matters often involved with laws targeting illegal immigrants. The field preemption analysis necessarily and simply focuses on
whether there is a federal scheme so pervasive "that Congress left no room
for the States to supplement it,"'' and, when technically followed, fails to
143. Manny Fernandez, White House Rejects Petitionsto Secede, but Texans Fight On, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 15, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/16/us/politics/texas-secession-movement-unbowed-bywhite-house-rejection.html?_r=0.
144. At varying times, the following states were petitioning the Obama Administration to secede:
Louisiana (38,991 signatures), Florida (37,014 signatures), Alabama (31,597 signatures), and Arizona
(26,743 signatures). See We the People Petition the Obama Administration to:, WHITEHOUSE.GOV,
https://petitions.whitehouse.gov (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
145.

Peter H. Schuck, Law and the Study of Migration,in MIGRATION THEORY: TALKING ACROSS

187, 197 (Caroline B. Brettell & James F. Hollifield eds., 2000).
Id.
Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Forced Federalism:States As Laboratoriesof Immigration ReHASTINGS L.J. 1673, 1708 (2011) (citing Schuck, supra note 145, at 197).
Id.
Illegal Immigration-The $113 Billion Dollar Drain on the American Taxpayer, supra note
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146.
147.
form, 62
148.
149.
126.
150.

Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 147, at 1710 (citing RANDY
1 (2005)).
151. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
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address or consider the discriminatory intent behind many of these laws.
Considering the repugnant racial undertones of much of this legislation,
courts have understandably "supplemented" their preemption analyses
with equal protection considerations. a5 2 While laudable, backdoor incorporation of equal protection into field preemption produces undesirable
secondary effects: it unnecessarily complicates and dilutes field preemption
jurisprudence, does not address the dominant issue, and sends the wrong
message to non-federal entities driven by discriminatory animus.
Misapplication of field preemption communicates the wrong message
to localities. Striking local laws on questionable field preemption grounds
sends a message that "the federal government occupies the entire immigration field, including all matters that marginally implicate immigration, but
the government is either unwilling or impotent to address the adverse impacts of illegal immigration." States are understandably confused, even infuriated, by this ill-fitted justification. But if such legislation is struck down
under the Equal Protection Clause, the message becomes substantially different and certainly more credible, namely, that, immigration polices inundated with racial undertones will not be tolerated and "no State shall deny
'
any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws."153
This is a
straightforward, logical, and constitutionally defensible position.
In sum, field preemption of laws marginally implicating immigration
matters incorrectly equates indirect regulations with direct ones. It also
contravenes principles of federalism. The federal government does not
have the resources or the desire to address local immigration related
problems. And it should not. It should be concerned with policies on a
national level, such as discrimination, and the entry and exit of immigrants.
B.

The Problems with Conflict Preemption

While analyzing the issue under conflict preemption-whether under
the obstacle 154 or impossibility conflict 155 subset-appears to be a sensible
alternative to an overbroad field preemption approach, the doctrine is
nonetheless problematic and its use should be significantly curtailed. In
the context of immigration, there are serious deficiencies with utilization of
conflict preemption generally, even greater problems with obstacle preemption specifically, and less serious, but certainly not trivial issues
spawned by the direct conflict test.
Generally, conflict preemption is flawed because it is ambiguous and
incredibly malleable. The Court's recent rulings support both a narrow,
direct conflict test and the much broader obstacle preemption standard.
Federal courts attempting to apply recent precedent are understandably
reaching conflicting results.
152.
153.
154.
155.

See infra notes 177-82 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
Also referred to as "implied" preemption.
The impossibility preemption subset is also referred to as a "direct conflict" test.
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The issues generated by the use and misuse of the obstacle preemption
subset are especially troublesome, possibly insurmountable, and the Court
should seriously consider abandoning its application in the immigration
context altogether. Obstacle preemption has recently been misapplied: traditionally, the doctrine's parameters are determined by Congress rather
than by Executive policy. Nonetheless, courts are misinterpreting the doctrine and are preempting local, immigration related laws because they conflict with Executive objectives. Even when applied correctly, obstacle
preemptions is flawed because its reach extends farther than field preemption's, completely precluding states from counteracting the adverse impacts
of illegal immigration. The doctrine is also deficient because it fails to consider racial animus. Considering these factors, the analysis ultimately concludes that elevated scrutiny of local immigration-related legislation under
the Equal Protection Clause is the most sensible solution.
1. The Conflict Preemption Spectrum: Does the Obstacle or
Impossibility Preemption Test Control? The Problems with
Conflict Preemption Generally
The malleable doctrine of conflict preemption extends over a farreaching spectrum, and courts attempting to consistently apply its principles are understandably failing. The obstacle preemption subset can be applied where the challenged state law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."' 56 The more narrow impossibility test is invoked where a non-federal law makes it "impossible to comply with both the state and federal
'
law."157
The Supreme Court has applied both standards in the immigration
context.
Recently, the Whiting Court concluded that conflict preemption applies where state laws "directly interfered" in a "uniquely federal area of
regulation," perhaps signaling a shift towards an impossibility test in immigration matters. 58 The impossibility test is extraordinarily narrow, essentially looking to whether the state regulation and the "federal law give
directly conflicting commands.' 59 Less than two years after Whiting, however, the Arizona Court indicated that the broader obstacle preemption
standard is still relevant in the immigration debate. In Arizona, the law at
issue, S.B. 1070, did not directly conflict with any federal statute, but the
Court invoked obstacle preemption and struck the substance of the Arizona law on the rationale that portions of it posed "an obstacle to the
framework Congress put in place."' 60
Because the Court has adopted such a wide ranging approach to conflict preemption in Whiting and Arizona, lower courts applying the flexible
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 573 (2009).
Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1983 (2011).
Gilbert, supra note 53, at 163.
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2508 (2012).
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doctrine have ruled inconsistently, spawning litigation and ambiguity in
preemption jurisprudence. For example, both the Fifth Circuit in City of
FarmersBranch and the Third Circuit in City of Hazleton leaned heavily on
language from Arizona and struck the housing ordinance under obstacle
preemption. 16 1 Confronting what was essentially the same law, the Eighth
Circuit in City of Fremont likewise concluded that conflict preemption applied, but drew from Whiting and performed what appeared to be a direct
conflict test. Unsurprisingly, the City of Fremont court upheld the law.' 62
For reasons discussed below, the direct conflict test is preferable to the
obstacle preemption standard. However, the direct conflict approach is
only useful when used to strike local, immigration related laws. The doctrine is defective when these non-federal legislations are upheld because it
fails to take into account the fact that many of these laws are permeated
with discriminatory intent.
2. The Doctrinal Meanderings in Obstacle Preemption: Congressional
Legislation, Rather than Executive Policy, is Preemption
Determinative
A troubling trend is signaled by federal courts concluding that it is
Executive policy rather than Congressional legislation that is determinative
of the obstacle preemption issue. The justification is that there is a need
for uniform application of federal immigration policy, a need that the Nation speak with "one voice.' 63 This approach defines the federal government's preemption powers in terms of Executive preference and expands
the reach of preemption to borders not contemplated by Congress-to an
extent that completely restricts state involvement in immigration matters of
local concern. For example, the City of Farmers Branch majority obstacle
preempted portions of the ordinance because there were potentially circumstances where an undocumented immigrant would be denied housing
while at the same time federal officers, acting on orders from the Executive
branch, would choose not to deport that individual.' 64
However, a solely federal enforcement scheme or "one tailored to target only criminal aliens has no support" in the INA. 16 1 In fact, Congress
161. See, e.g., Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d 524, 529 (5th Cir.
2013) (en banc) (holding that the city ordinance's criminal enforcement provisions were obstacle preempted because, like the laws at issue in Arizona, they "'disrupt[ed] the federal [immigration] framework,' both by interfering with the federal anti-harboring law and by allowing state officers to "hold []
aliens in custody for possible unlawful presence without federal direction and supervision").
162. Keller v. City of Fremont, 719 F.3d 931, 945 (8th Cir. 2013).
163. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2507.
164. See generally City of Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d at 540 ("[T]he INA creates multiple categories of aliens subject to removal, and it provides for the expedited removal of certain aliens. 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1227-1228. It also expressly grants discretion for the Attorney General to waive removal under
certain circumstances, such as for humanitarian purposes or for victims of domestic abuse.").
165. Larson, supra note 135, at 809.
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has made clear that persons residing in the United States without authorization must be removed.166 Yet the Executive branch and the judiciary
continue to "distort traditional [obstacle] preemption analysis asserting
that it is Executive priorities and strategies that are determinative, not
Congress.' "167 The absurd implications of such an approach are exposed
when one considers the contours of obstacle preemption in the immigration field, and its precedent, would likely change every four to eight years.
For example, would the City of FarmersBranch ordinance be preempted if
our next President began to aggressively deport undocumented immigrants? This departure from obstacle preemption's doctrinal moorings is
even more troublesome when one considers that there are significant
problems generated by correct application of obstacle preemption
principles.
3.

The Problems with Obstacle Preemption: The Doctrine Precludes
State Involvement and Does Not Allow for Consideration of
Racial Animus

Even where courts take the technically correct approach to obstacle
preemption, the problems created by its use in the immigration context
seriously undermine its feasibility. Accordingly, its application should be
significantly curbed, if not altogether abandoned. Obstacle preemption
does not take into account discriminatory intent, which is undeniably present in some of these local laws. Additionally, obstacle preemption, like
misapplication of field preemption, completely bars states from validly confronting the unwanted effects of illegal immigration. But courts understandably are taking the racial dimension into account, in effect applying
heightened scrutiny under what is posed as preemption analysis. But this
approach complicates preemption law and is unnecessary because a common sense, equal-protection analysis is available.
The boundaries of field preemption have been clearly defined, although its limits have been recently expanded. 68 Obstacle preemption's
reach, on the other hand, appears limitless. The doctrine has recently been
expanded beyond the logical boundaries of preemption jurisprudence to
strike local laws only marginally implicating federal immigration policy.
Such a broad reading of the doctrine destroys potential for even the slightest of local participation in immigration matters, an approach that contravenes traditional notions of federalism. In the field preemption context,
the significant problems associated with prohibiting state involvement have
been addressed above,'169 and the justifications for allowing a degree of local participation in the immigration field applies with equal force to an
overbroad reading of obstacle preemption. However, there is also a need
166. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1232 (2012) (defining classifications of persons who must be removed); 8
U.S.C. §§ 1321-1330 (2012) (providing criminal and civil sanctions for unauthorized aliens).
167. Larson, supra note 135, at 810.
168. See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 114-53 and accompanying text.
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that non-federal entities, when attempting to counteract the adverse effects
of illegal immigration, proceed in a non-discriminatory manner.
There is substantial evidence-in some cases disguised and in others
explicit-supporting the conclusion that non-federal entities are discriminating on the basis of race and national origin when enacting these laws.
Kris Kobach, the prolific architect of many state's anti-illegal immigrant
legislation, has been accused of having connections to white supremacy
groups 170 and has been criticized for attempting to justify Apartheid in
South Africa. 171 In addition to authoring the laws at issue in Arizona, City
of Hazleton, City of FarmersBranch, and City of Fremont, Kobach contributed to the creation of H.B. 56, a law passed by the Alabama legislature
which made it a felony for illegal aliens to enter into a "business transac1 72
tion" in the U.S.

Under that law, however unlikely for the penalty to actually be imposed, it was possible for an illegal alien to spend 10 years in prison for
paying their water bill. The Bill was ultimately struck down by the Eleventh Circuit, and the district judge noted that the "debate on HB 56 was
laced with derogatory comments about Hispanics."' 73 In the legislative
minutes, an Alabama representative, referring to illegal aliens employed by
Alabama businessmen, stated that
"I saw.., about 30 of them [Hispanics] get out of a car one
day. I see these guys-I thought it was a circus. They kept
getting out and kept getting out .... [B]ut the kidding part

about it now is if we stop the employer from employing
them, they won't come. Now, that is why I4 would like to see
1' 7
a ... law that ... punishes employers.'
Tim O'Hare, the former mayor of the City of Farmers Branch and the catalyst behind the City's anti-immigrant-housing ordinance, reportedly justified the law on grounds that Hispanics were a "less desirable people" who
"don't value education" and "don't take care of their properties."' 175 Considering these factors, it is understandable that courts, when conducting
their obstacle preemption analysis, are carefully scrutinizing these laws and
making results oriented, rather than principles based decisions.

170. Dylan Byers, "Oppo" Men Break Silence on Kris Kobach, POLITICO (Feb. 10, 2012, 9:17
AM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/media/2012/02/oppo-men-break-silence-on-kris-kobach-114120.
html.
171. Id.
172. Cent. Ala. Fair Housing Ctr. v. Magee, 835 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (M.D. Ala. 2011).
173. Id. at 1193.
174. Id.
175. Brantley Hargrove, Farmers Branch Has Spent Five Years and Millions of Dollars Trying to
Keep Out Mexicans: Is it Time for a Truce?, DALLAS OBSERVER (June 21, 2012), http://www.dalas
observer.comI20l2-06-21/news/farmers-branch-has-spent-five-years-and-millions-of-dollars-trying-tokeep-out-mexicans-is-it-time-for-a-truce/.
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The results oriented approach is analytically tenuous because these
anti-immigrant laws were carefully crafted in order to avoid conflict, evidenced by the fact that the Fifth Circuit, in City of FarmersBranch, obstacle-preempted on grounds that a subsection of a subsection buried within
the ordinance potentially created conflict with Executive policy.' 7 6 Such a
questionable preemption analysis only encourages localities to go back to
the drawing board, with the opinion as a blueprint for non-preemption, and
to re-draft in order avoid conflict. But if or when future anti-immigrant
legislation is challenged, no matter how meticulously crafted, it will likely
be invalidated because courts are apparently incorporating backdoor
equal-protection considerations and are invalidating laws that would stand
under an accurate reading of preemption jurisprudence.
A closer inspection of the City of FarmersBranch opinion reveals that
the court examined the housing ordinance with a suspicious eye, concerned
that the City's proffered reasons were pretext for discriminatory impetus.
For example, the court stated that the city "never mentioned any housing
problem;'1 77 expressed concerns that landlords would simply choose "not
to deal with Latino people," irrespective of their immigration status;178 remarked that "a country's treatment of non-citizens within its borders can
gravely affect foreign relations;' 79 stated that the "ordinance is surely offensive to immigrants and to our neighbors to the south;"'8 0 and opined
that the ordinance "singles out illegal immigrants for adverse treatment"
which is "reminiscent of the "anti-Japanese fever" that existed in the
of that type is not
1940s."'' l The concurrence concluded that "[1]egislation
8 2
entitled to wear the cloak of constitutionality.'1
The incorporation of consideration of race and national origin discrimination into the preemption analysis is understandable, but is nonetheless
problematic. Justifying preemption-whether implicitly or explicitly-for
reasons beyond the scope of preemption jurisprudence does not send a
prophylactic message to discriminatory actors, and as such only encourages
localities to re-draft to avoid conflict. Considering these factors, the better
and most pragmatic approach is to analyze local legislation targeting undocumented immigrants under equal-protection principles, which addresses the racial concerns but will also allow for state involvement over
matters of local concern.

176. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d 524, 549 (5th Cir. 2013) (en
banc) (Dennis, J., specially concurring).
177. Id. at 539 (Reavley, J., concurring only in the judgment).
178. Id. at 543.
179. Id. at 526 (majority opinion).
180. Id. at 543 (Reavley, J., concurring only in the judgment).
181. Id. (citing Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 422 (1948)).
182. Id.
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IV.

A

SOLUTION SOMEWHERE IN THE MIDDLE: ELEVATED SCRUTINY
OF LOCAL LEGISLATION TARGETING ILLEGAL ALIENS

Because of misapplication of the preemption doctrine, federal courts
are intruding into a realm that has traditionally been reserved for the
states. This is especially disconcerting because the federal government continues to demonstrate an inability or lack of desire to confront immigration
related problems that manifest locally. However, while there is a need for
non-federal involvement, localities are often fueled by discriminatory animus. These problems cannot be adequately addressed by the use of federal
preemption analysis or current use of the equal-protection doctrine. But a
simple solution exists. If the Court elevated the scrutiny level-whether it
is to rational basis with a bite or to intermediate scrutiny-lower courts
could engage in a straightforward analysis, and reach decisions that give
proper consideration to the conflicting policies at play. Harold Koh, former dean of Yale law school, opined that:
I prefer an equal protection approach to a preemption approach, not simply because it clearly separates what is constitutional from what federal policy makers happen to think
is wise, but more fundamentally, because it answers, in a
way that preemption reasoning does not, the moral and
philosophical claims83that resident aliens make against their
1
state governments.
A.

The History of Equal Protection and Immigration

1. The Progression of Equal Protection Generally
The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause provides in
relevant part that "no state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 1 84 The Court's first landmark Equal
Protection decision, Strauder v. West Virginia, dealt with a West Virginia
statute that prohibited African-Americans from serving on a jury. 185 The
Strauder Court held that the statute was unconstitutional, reasoning that
the clause was enacted "to assure to the colored race the enjoyment of all
'
Three
the civil rights that under the law are enjoyed by white persons."186
years later, in the Civil Rights Cases, the Court instituted the "state action
doctrine," which dictates that the guarantees of the Equal Protection
Clause apply only to acts done or otherwise "sanctioned in some way" by a
187
state actor.
183. Harold Hongju Koh, Equality with a Human Face:Justice Blackmun and the Equal Protection
of Aliens, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 51, 99 (1985).

184.
185.
186.
187.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 304 (1879).
Id. at 306.
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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Soon after, but before the recognition of strict scrutiny, the Court determined that all races and nationalities were covered by the Equal Protection Clause. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the Court confronted a San Francisco
law which prohibited Chinese from owning laundromats. 188 The Court
held that Chinese noncitizens were "persons" under the Fourteenth
Amendment and thus were guaranteed "equal protection of the laws." 18 9
The Court announced that the mandates of the Fourteenth Amendment
"are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of
nationality." 190
2.

Equal Protection and the Differing Levels of Judicial Scrutiny

Following Yick Wo, the Court battled with the fact that most laws inevitably distinguish between classifications to some degree, and that every
legal classification is not, per se, a denial of equal protection. 191 Initially,
state classifications, regardless of the motivations undergirding the enactments, were given a presumption of constitutionality. 9 2 Strict level scrutiny recognized that some state classifications were for illegitimate reasons;
the doctrine grew from the concern that "discrete and insular" minorities
were especially susceptible to Equal Protection violations. 93 In what has
been recognized as the first case applying strict scrutiny, Korematsu v.
United States, the Court examined a World War II era law that sent all
persons of Japanese ancestry living in the United States to concentration
camps.' 9 4 The Court held that "legal restrictions which curtail the civil
rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect" and such laws
therefore must be subjected to "the most rigid scrutiny."' 95 The concept of
strict scrutiny has since been refined, and is now invoked in situations
where "fundamental rights" or "suspect classifications" are involved. 196 To
be
pass constitutional muster under strict scrutiny, the law in question must
"narrowly tailored" to meet a "compelling governmental interest."'197
Until 1976, if a fundamental right or a suspect classification were not
at issue, then the Court subjected the legislation to "rational basis review,"
which dictates that when a law is "reasonably related" to a "legitimate governmental interest," it is constitutionally permissible. Under rational basis
188. 118 U.S. 356, 357 (1886).
189. Id. at 369.
190. Id.
191. See generally F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 414 (1920); Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (stating that the "Fourteenth Amendment's promise that no person shall be
denied the equal protection of the laws must coexist with the practical necessity that most legislation
classifies for one purpose or another, with resulting disadvantage to various groups or persons").
192. Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940).
193. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
194. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
195. Id. at 216.
196. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (analyzing an Oklahoma law requiring forced
sterilization of certain felons under the equivalent of strict scrutiny because it implicated the fundamental right to procreate).
197. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
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review, there is a strong presumption that the action at issue is legitimate.1 98 However, in Craig v. Boren,199 the Court examined claims of gender discrimination and instituted a third level of scrutiny, commonly
referred to as intermediate scrutiny. The Oklahoma law at issue prohibited
the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 but allowed females over
the age of 18 to purchase it.2 0 The Court held that strict scrutiny was not
applicable because gender was not a "suspect class," but rejected the rational basis standard. z ' In so doing, the Court recognized gender as a
"quasi-suspect" class, deserving of elevated scrutiny. 2 To survive intermediate scrutiny, the Court announced that the law must "serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement
of those objectives. "203
Although most enactments subjected to intermediate scrutiny are invalidated, some are upheld. For example, in Michael M. v. Superior Court
of Sonoma County, the Court examined California's statutory rape law,
which applied only to males, and upheld the law under intermediate scrutiny.2 "4 The important governmental objectives accepted by the Court
were prevention of teenage pregnancy and the need to encourage females
to report incidents of rape. 0 5 The Court reasoned that females would
surely be "less likely to report violations
of the statute if she herself would
206
prosecution.
criminal
be subject to
Subsequent decisions suggest that there exists a more polished continuum within the three tiers. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
the Court confronted a law that restricted construction of homes for the
mentally disabled within the city limits and held that it was unconstitutional.207 The Court stated that mentally disabled individuals are neither a
suspect nor quasi-suspect class, and thus that mere rational basis applied,
but nonetheless held that there was no rational basis for the law in question.20 8 This has been referred to as "rational basis with a bite. 2 0 9 More
recently, this form of elevated scrutiny has been employed to strike enactments directed at the homosexual community. 1 0
198. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 77 (2001).
199. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
200. Id. at 218.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 220.
204. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
205. Id. at 473-74.
206. Id. at 474.
207. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
208. Id. at 450.
209. See Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other
Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 793 (1987) (recognizing that City of Cleburnewas analyzed under rational basis,
but with a "bite"); Jeremy B. Smith, Note, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the Supreme
Court Should Acknowledge Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Sexual
Orientation, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2797 (2005) (same).

210. See generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (analyzing a Colorado law that had an
adverse impact on homosexuals apparently under rational basis review, but rejecting Colorado's proffered reason for the law-to uphold the sanctity of marriage and encourage procreation; the Court
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The Evolution of Equal Protection within Immigration

Although Yick Wo's declaration that all persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction are entitled to "equal protection of the laws" seems uncomplicated,
application of the Equal Protection Clause to immigration is currently anything but straightforward. Two important concepts control where the
Equal Protection Clause is implicated in immigration matters. First, the
plenary power doctrine dictates that federal legislation targeting noncitizens, both legal and illegal aliens, whether the law classifies on the basis
of alienage or race, is subject only to rational basis review. In contrast,
state actions directed at a specific race or at legal aliens are subject to strict
scrutiny. Second, state actions targeting illegal aliens are reviewed under
the rational basis test, but some type of heightened scrutiny is applied to
state legislation targeting children of illegal aliens.
211
1. The Plenary Power Doctrine

Congress has the complete, or "plenary power" to regulate immigration law.2 12 The regulation of immigration deals primarily with the admission and expulsion of noncitizens.2 13 Congressional power to exclude or
expel persons of a specific nationalities or races has been repeatedly upheld. For example, in the 1880's, Congress enacted the Chinese Exclusion
Act, legislation which, among other restrictions, prohibited persons of Chinese descent from immigrating to the United States.2 14 Portions of this legislation were challenged on equal-protection grounds, but the Court's
ensuing holdings signaled that Congress "possessed a plenary immigration
power, and that exercises of this power largely were immune from judicial
oversight," regardless of the fact that the laws were obviously discriminatory.21 5 Application of the plenary power doctrine over the six decades
following Chae Chan Ping focused on situations involving national security,
and the Court affirmed its stance that Congress has complete power over
immigration. 21 6' Thus, the plenary power doctrine establishes the principle
that, in matters of admission and expulsion from the United States, Congressional action-even if discriminatory-is largely shielded from judicial
oversight.
invalidated the law because the law did "not to further a proper legislative end but... [attempted to]
make [homosexuals] unequal to everyone else").
211. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
212. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889) (establishing Congress' complete power over immigration matters, explaining that Congress "can exclude aliens from its territory,"
and that a nation's "[j]urisdiction over its own territory... is an incident of every independent nation").
213. Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary CongressionalPower,
1984 Sup. CT. REV. 255, 256.
214. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 581.
215. See Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power,
Equal Protection, and Federalism,76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 503 (2001).
216. See generally Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (holding that the Alien Registration Act of 1940 did not deprive a Greek national of Due Process rights when he was deported for
being a communist); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765-67 (1972) (holding that federal statute
refusing entry of communists did not violate American citizen's Constitutional rights to freedom of
speech).
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The Intersection of Equal Protection, the Differing Levels of
Scrutiny, and the Plenary Power

In 1948, almost sixty years after striking the facially discriminatory
state law in Yick Wo, the Court invalidated a law that did not overtly discriminate on the basis of race, but rather implicitly discriminated on the
basis of alienage.217 In Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, the Court
dealt with a California statute that prohibited persons who were ineligible
for citizenship from obtaining fishing licenses. 18 While not explicitly singling out Japanese fishermen, the law was undoubtedly intended to discriminate as Japanese at that time, but few other races, were ineligible for
citizenship. 219 The Court engaged in an equal-protection analysis and invalidated the statute on the rationale that the "Fourteenth Amendment
and the laws adopted under its authority ...embody a general policy that
all persons lawfully in this country shall abide 'in any state' on an equality
of legal privileges with all citizens under non-discriminatory laws. "220
In Graham v. Richardson, the Court then established strict scrutiny for
state actions classifying on the basis of alienage. 22' The Graham Court
faced state statutes that denied legal permanent residents access to welfare
benefits.2 22 The Court's equal-protection analysis concluded that the laws
were unconstitutional, reasoning that aliens "as a class are a prime example
of a 'discrete and insular' minority for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate. ' 223 Justice Blackmun recognized that states have an
interest in preserving limited fiscal resources, but found that this concern
did not withstand strict scrutiny.224
In contrast, five years later in Matthews v. Diaz, the Court examined a
very similar federal statute, which also denied access to welfare for legal
resident aliens, but summoned the plenary power doctrine and unanimously upheld the law under rational basis review. 2 25 The Matthews Court
recognized that the law discriminated on the basis of alienage, and thus
that their decision was at odds with Graham's strict scrutiny standard.22 a
But the Court distinguished the cases based on the federal government's
plenary power over immigration, reasoning that the "Fourteenth Amendment's limits on state powers are substantially different from the constitutional provisions applicable to the federal power over immigration and
naturalization. "227
217.
alien.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Alienage denotes one's status as a noncitizen. One can be either a legal alien or an illegal
334 U.S. 410 (1948).
Id.
Id. at 420.
403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
Id. at 368.
Id. at 371-72 (citing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4).
Id. at 382.
Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
Id. at 84.
Id. at 86-87.
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While state actions targeting a single race or laws implicating aliens in
the U.S. legally are analyzed under strict scrutiny, and inevitably invalidated, state actions implicating illegal aliens are subjected only to rational
basis review and are generally upheld. In Plyler v. Doe, the Court examined a Texas statute that denied free public education to children of
illegal immigrants, announced that rational basis review applied to undocumented aliens, but carved out an exception and held that elevated scrutiny
applied to laws directed at the children of illegal immigrants.228 Under elevated scrutiny, the Court held that the statute was unconstitutional under
the Equal Protection Clause.2 2 9 Texas argued that the law was nondiscriminatory, that it simply attempted to alleviate the "drain" on the state's fiscal
resources. 23 0 Writing for a sharply divided Court, Justice Brennan recognized that all persons within U.S. jurisdiction are covered by the Equal
Protection Clause, 23 ' but held that strict scrutiny did not apply to undocumented immigrants because the fact that they are in the country illegally
was "not a constitutional irrelevancy. "232
However, the Court struck the law because it was "difficult to conceive
of a rational justification for penalizing . . .children for their [unlawful]
presence within the United States," an involuntary choice.2 3 3 In a telling
comment, the Court stated that such laws may only "be justified by a showconfirming that some
ing that it furthers some 'substantial state interest,"'
234
form of heightened scrutiny was employed.
C. Heightened Scrutiny-but not Strict Scrutiny-Should Apply to Local
Legislation Directed at Undocumented Aliens
Undocumented immigrants, because laws directed at them are reviewed for mere rationality, receive less than equal protection and thus are
in danger of becoming "non-person[s], outlaws[s] outside the protection of
the legal system. 235 The specter of less than equal protection is seemingly
irreconcilable with the Equal Protection Clause, which dictates that no
state shall deny any person within its jurisdiction of the equal protection of
the law; the "inclusion of 'any' person without any modifiers appears to
establish the Framers' intent to protect all people within the state's jurisdiction," irrespective of immigration status.236 However, the standard of strict
scrutiny represents the most extreme protection our Constitution offers,
228. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982).
229. Id. at 225.
230. Id. at 207.
231. "[E]ven aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long been recognized as "persons" guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 210 (quoting
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)).
232. Id. at 223.
233. Id. at 220.
234. Id. at 230.
235. Gerald Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition187, and the Structure
of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1441 (1995).
236. Sonny Behrends, Immigration Reform: A Reflection on Arizona Bill 1070 and Beyond, 9 REGENT J. INT'L L. 75, 94 (2012).
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covers only a select few, and it is impractical to extend the full protections
of U.S. law to persons who are here in violation of the law. This section
concludes that something less than strict scrutiny but more than rational
basis should apply to local laws aimed at undocumented aliens (i.e., either
intermediate scrutiny or rational basis with a bite).
1. Strict Scrutiny Should Not Apply
Illegal aliens should not receive the full set of constitutional rights that
U.S. citizens and legal aliens do. Indeed, it is a tenuous position to argue
that persons who have willfully violated U.S. law are entitled to the same
legal protections as U.S. citizens and lawful aliens. The advent of strict
scrutiny was in large part instituted to ferret out discrimination based on
morally irrelevant traits, and strong arguments can be made that classifications based on unlawful immigration status are morally relevant.237 If the
equal protection/alienage issue is framed solely in terms of morality, and
ignores the underlying racial element altogether, then proponents to the
current rational basis standard are on firm footing indeed.238
Further, should this local legislation be subjected to strict, equal-protection scrutiny, the incentives to immigrate legally would further erode
and illegal aliens would arguably have greater rights than U.S. citizens. The
U.S., in many regards, is already a welcoming destination for illegal immigrants. In addition to the prospects of higher wages, better standards of
living, and the fact that their chances of being deported are virtually nonexistent,2 3 9 undocumented aliens currently have access to significant legal
rights outside of the equal protection doctrine. For example, illegal aliens
receive due process of law, are entitled to workers' compensation benefits,
can sue in tort and contract, and possess the right to sue under federal
labor protection statutes.24 ° In all these cases, it is significant that "state
and local governments do not have to pay any of the direct costs of the
illegal immigrants' recoveries except for the administrative costs of al'2 4 1
lowing access to the court."
In contrast, for most Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection cases,
"it is the state that bears the expenses of the plaintiff's victory." 242 If legislation pointed at illegal aliens is subjected to strict scrutiny, they would
237. See generally Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection:A Conceptualizationand Appraisal,
79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1062 (1979) (arguing that classifications based on alienage do not implicate
the Equal Protection Clause because alienage is a morally relevant trait).
238. This argument, of course, is not altogether sound for many reasons, two of which stand out.
First, local legislation classifying persons based on immigration status are often proxies for racial discrimination. Second, whether the United States Constitution is a definitive source of morality, especially in situations where individuals are escaping abject poverty in hopes of a better life, is
questionable.
239. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
240. See generally Lee, supra note 68, at 12 (citing cases where courts have decided to extend to
illegal immigrants the equivalent rights as U.S. citizens and legal immigrants).
241. Id. at 21 (citing Montoya v. Gateway Ins. Co., 401 A.2d 1102,1106 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1979)).
242. Id.
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have compelling equal-protection grievances local governments, and it can
be argued that any equal-protection victory by an undocumented immigrant would be tantamount to forcing state taxpayers "to subsidize an ille'
Moreover, illegal
gal entrant's continued presence in the country."243
aliens avoid military service and civic duties that U.S. citizens and legal
aliens cannot. To extend illegal aliens the full set of rights enjoyed citizens
and legal residents, while allowing them to avoid attendant civic obligations, would confer to them an unjustifiably enlarged set of rights.
2.

Some Form of Elevated Scrutiny Should Apply

Although strict scrutiny of local anti-immigrant laws is unjustifiable, to
conclude that undocumented immigrants are entitled to the bare minimum
protections against discriminatory state actors would defy the foundational
principles of equality and dignity underlying the Equal Protection Clause.
In fact, when applied in this context, the rational basis standard relegates
unlawful immigrants to the status of "nonpersons," affords them no mean24 4
ingful protection, and drives them further into the "shadow population.
It is an established constitutional principle that, under the rational basis
standard, the Court "will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive. ' 245 Thus, even the
most repugnant, racially motivated state actions aimed at illegal aliens
would survive the rational basis test: there will always be, at least on the
surface, more than reasonable justifications for such legislation. 46
In Graham v. Richardson, the case applying strict scrutiny to state legislation aimed at legal aliens, the Court annunciated two justifications for
strict scrutiny which supports the conclusion that some form of elevated
scrutiny, but not strict, should apply to state actions aimed at illegal immigrants. Justice Blackmun first reasoned that aliens as a class-both illegal
and illegal immigrants-were a "prime example of a 'discrete and insular'
247
minority for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.
Second, Justice Blackmun alluded to a quid quo pro relationship between
the government and legal aliens. He stated that legal "aliens like citizens
pay taxes and may be called into the armed forces. ' 248 While undocumented aliens are not bound to serve, they do pay some taxes and, even
more than legal aliens, they satisfy the discrete and insular component underlying the rationale for elevating scrutiny.
Before exploring the legal feasibility of elevating scrutiny, the issue
should be viewed outside the more technical aspects of Constitutional jurisprudence and the complexities of the tiered scrutiny scheme. From times
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Montoya, 401 A.2d at 1106.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218 (1982).
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968).
See supra footnotes 119-50 and accompanying text.
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
Id. at 377.
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ancient, the vulnerability of aliens was recognized, and the Biblical mandate to treat nonresidents justly was often repeated. For example, Exodus
22:21 dictates, "do not mistreat an alien or oppress him, for you were aliens
in Egypt." Leviticus 19:34 proclaims, "the alien living with you must be
treated as one of your native-born. Love him as yourself, for you were
aliens in Egypt." Professor Gerald Neuman suggests that under the rational basis-regime, even laws refusing undocumented immigrants "basic
government services like police protection and the prosecution of crimes
committed against" the alien would be constitutionally permissible.249
While Professor Neuman's example is extreme, it is not far removed from
local legislation already on the books, such as the Alabama law that allowed U.S. citizens to nullify contracts entered into with illegal aliens.2
To allow laws of this nature, without further examination, would contravene the purposes underpinning the Equal Protection Clause, and arguably
even challenge fundamental human decency.
3.

The Traditional Justifications for Intermediate Scrutiny Extend to
Illegal Aliens

To abandon the rational basis standard and elevate the scrutiny level
would be consistent with the reasoning in cases where the Court instituted
intermediate scrutiny. Although the Court's criteria for imposing heightened scrutiny is not fixed, and is anything but clear," 1 intermediate scrutiny generally applies where government action affects a suspect 252 or
"quasi-suspect" class,253 or impacts a fundamental right.254 Determination
of whether a group is quasi-suspect involves consideration of whether (1)
the class has historically been discriminated against, (2) whether the group
lacks political power, and (3) whether the classification is based on an immutable characteristic that defines the group.255
a. A History of Discrimination
Immigrants generally, and especially illegal immigrants, without doubt
have suffered a history of discrimination. Benjamin Franklin, ironically a
first generation immigrant himself, questioned why German immigrants
should "be suffered to swarm into our Settlements, and by herding together, establish their Language and Manners, to the Exclusion of
249. Neuman, supra note 235, at 1447.
250. See Cent. Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Magee, 835 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1179 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (discussing mentioned provisions).
251. Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications,35 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 135, 147 (2011)
(exploring the Court's guidelines for elevating scrutiny and arguing that those guidelines are unclear).
252. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (race is a suspect classification and
accordingly receives strict scrutiny).
253. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 726 (1982) (gender is a quasi-suspect classification, receiving intermediate scrutiny).
254. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (right to procreate is a fundamental right).
255. Mitchell Kurfis, The Constitutionality of California'sProposition187: An Equal Protection
Analysis, 32 CAL. W. L. REV. 129, 150 (1995).
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' 25 6
ours?"1

The influx of Irish immigrants in the 1840's was met with a similar nativist response. 257 Perhaps the most remarkable example of anti-immigrant fervor was the "Yellow Peril," a period beginning in the 1870's and
extending through the 1920's in which Chinese immigrants faced some of
the most draconian legislation our Nation has ever seen. In this period,
Chinese nationals were prohibited from entering the country.258 Chinese
Americans were prohibited from marrying whites, could not testify against
whites in court, and their children were prohibited from attending public
school.259
More recently, nativist backlash has focused on the Hispanic community. As an extreme example, a group of vigilante border patrolmen in
Arizona, dubbed the "Minutemen," espouse violence as a deterrent to illegal immigration. 26° Their former executive director, Shawna Forde, was
convicted for her involvement in a racially motivated triple homicide of a
Hispanic family. 26 1 In 2000, a United Nations envoy was dispatched to the
Arizona/Mexico border to investigate a string of murders attributed to vigilante justice.262
b.

PoliticalPowerlessness

The political voice of undocumented aliens is marginal, at best. The
Court has stated that a group is politically powerless when its members
"have no ability to attract the attention of the lawmakers." 263 The ratio"courts
nale behind this factor is the same reason behind the other factors:
2 64
must protect groups that are vulnerable to legislative bias.
Scholars and judges attempting to make sense of the issue have suggested a number of factors by which to determine powerlessness. Relevant
factors include "(1) the group's ability to vote; (2) the existence of
favorable legislative enactments that might demonstrate political power;
and (3) whether members of the group have achieved positions of power
265
and authority.
Illegal aliens, because they cannot vote, are the prototype of a politically powerless group. The legislative history pertaining to undocumented
256. BRENT ASHABRANNER, STILL A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS 18 (1993).
257. Id. at 26-27 (noting that many American employers posted signs that read "[n]o Irish need
apply").
258. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 582 (1889) (discussing relevant provisions

of the Chinese Exclusion Act).
259. PIERRE N. HAUSER, ILLEGAL ALIENS 30 (1990).
260. Jessie McKinnley, New BorderFear: Violence by a Rogue Militia, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/27/us/27arizona.html?pagewanted-all&_r=O.
261. Tim Vanderpool, Murder in the Desert: The Town of Arivaca Attempts to Recover After a
Double-Murder That Has the Anti-Immigrant Movement Reeling, TusCON WEEKLY (Jan. 14, 2010),
http://www.tucsonweekly.com/tucson/murder-in-the-desert/Content?oid=1739974.
262. Jan McGirk, UN Envoy is Sent to Investigate Rio Grande Shootings by Posses of Vigilante
Ranchers, THE INDEPENDENT, May 24, 2000, available at 2000 WLNR 6098897.
263. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985).
264. Strauss, supra note 251, at 153.
265. Id. at 154.
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immigrants confirms their status as a vulnerable group. Unlike other classifications, such as homosexuals, women, African-Americans, and the mentally disabled, illegal immigrants as a class have not enjoyed legislative
support. To the contrary, both the state and federal legislative histories are
replete with anti-immigrant enactments. 66
The undocumented community is not completely powerless, however.
Groups such as the ACLU and the Southern Poverty Law Center are advocating for immigrant rights. But this alone would not invalidate an inference that undocumented aliens are a politically vulnerable group,
and powerless
especially considering that "women do not constitute a small
267
minority yet still meet the political powerless element.5
c. Immutability
Immigration status is not an immutable characteristic, 268 but the Court
has never announced that this factor is an absolute requisite for elevated
scrutiny. The Plyler Court noted that "[s]everal formulations might explain
our treatment of certain classifications as 'suspect.' ",269 Indeed, in Graham
v. Richardson,the Court held that aliens as a class "are a prime example of
a 'discrete and insular' minority for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate," even though the legal aliens in that case were eligible
to become U.S. citizens (i.e., alienage is not an immutable characteristic but
receives heightened scrutiny). 27' However, the Plyler Court's primary justification for subjecting legislation directed at illegal aliens to mere rational
basis review is that illegal status is not an immutable characteristic, rather,
in the Plyler Court's view, it is the product of conscious, "unlawful action."' 27 ' Thus, while there are grounds for imposing intermediate scrutiny,
most significantly in Graham where the Court recognized that alienage was
not immutable but nonetheless extended strict scrutiny to cover lawful
aliens, Plyler suggests that intermediate scrutiny is not a realistic possibility.
4.

Rational Basis "With a Bite" is Also Justifiable

Even if the Court refuses to institute intermediate scrutiny, the rationales from cases following Plyer suggest that rational basis with a bite
should apply to undocumented immigrants. Courts have determined that
the homosexual community is not a quasi-suspect class on similar immutability grounds, reasoning that homosexuality is not immutable because it is
266. See supra notes 68-113, 212-34 and accompanying text.
267. Kurfis, supra note 255, at 154 (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685, 686 n.17
(1973) (plurality opinion)).
268. Because any individual can apply for and be "granted the status of naturalized citizens." See
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 650 (1973) (Renquist, J., dissenting).
269. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218 n.14 (1982) (emphasis added).
270. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). See also Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 641 (holding, under heightened scrutiny, that a New York statute that barred all legal aliens from New York civil
service positions was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause).
271. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220.
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272
Even so, in Romer v. Evans,
a volitional choice that defines the group.2
the Court-while acknowledging that homosexuals are not a suspect
class-imposed some type of elevated scrutiny 273 to strike a Colorado law
which was discriminatory towards homosexuals. 274 Although Colorado
posited what appeared to be reasonable, legitimate reasons for its law,275
the Court concluded that discriminatory animus towards homosexuals was
the driving factor. The Court's justification for elevated scrutiny, mainly
that, "if the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws'

means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare ...

desire to

harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest, ' 276 applies with equal force to undocumented immigrants.
V.

PROPOSED MODEL

Section III of this Comment concluded that for a number of reasons
the preemption doctrine, in the context of local legislation targeting illegal
immigrants, should be significantly curtailed. Section IV surmised that the
preemption doctrine's misgivings could be rectified by applying elevated
scrutiny under the equal protection doctrine. This Section aggregates the
conclusions from Sections III and IV into a proposed a model.
Where local legislation targets illegal immigrants, the following approach should be taken. Courts should make a threshold determination of
whether field preemption applies. Courts should use Field preemption
only in situations where local laws make direct attempts to regulate immigration. If field preemption is not implicated-i.e. in cases where local legislation tangentially implicates the entry and exit of aliens-the court
should move to a conflict preemption test, but should simply abandon the
obstacle preemption subset of conflict preemption. Instead, courts should
engage conflict preemption's narrower approach-a direct conflict test. If
there is actual conflict, rather than only a potential for conflict with federal
law or Congressional policy, then and only then should courts invoke conflict preemption principles to strike the law. If, on the other hand, there is
no conflict, but merely a potential for conflict, or the conflict can be
avoided by invalidating a relatively insignificant component of the law
272. See generally Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("homosexuality is primarily behavioral in nature and as such is not immutable"); see also High Tech Gays v. Def.
Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th Cir. 1990) (declining to apply heightened scrutiny
to the homosexual plaintiffs because "[h]omosexuality is not an immutable characteristic; it is behavioral and hence is fundamentally different from traits such as race, gender, or alienage"); but see Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 185 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that homosexuals compose a "quasisuspect" class and are accordingly are entitled to heightened scrutiny) affd on other grounds, 133 S. Ct.

2675 (2013).
273. Commentators agree that the "rational basis with a bite" elevated scrutiny level was employed in Romer. See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 760 (2011)
(acknowledging that rational basis with a bite was used in Romer); Smith, supra note 209, at 2770
(same); Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Individious Intent, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 89,
146 (1997) (same).
274. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996).
275. Protecting the sanctity of marriage and the States' interest in encouraging procreation.
276. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634-35 (quoting Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
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under review, then the court should refrain altogether from the conflict
preemption analysis and examine the law under equal-protection
principles.
Even where preemption principles are inoperative, it is inevitable that
sub-federal legislation implicating immigration will generate issues of
equal-protection. However, in order for the doctrine to be of any practical
use, the Court must elevate the scrutiny level from rational basis to some
form of elevated scrutiny. Local laws permeated with racial animus will
not withstand elevated scrutiny-where substantial and quantifiable evidence of the negative impacts of illegal immigration is lacking, an insurmountable inference of unconstitutional discrimination will be raised.
Under the proposed intermediate scrutiny standard, non-federal legislation would have to "serve an important governmental objective" and
would have to be "substantially related to achievement of those objectives"
to survive scrutiny.277 Generally speaking, there will always be important
objectives related to illegal immigration.2 78 In order to meet the "substantially related" portion of the test, however, non-federal entities would have
to make more than general recitations regarding its adverse impacts. Only
specific and quantifiable proof would withstand this standard.
Evidence could include police reports involving undocumented immigrants, related healthcare costs, and perhaps proof of declining property
values, to name a few. Consideration of the positive impacts the undocumented community confers to its locality would need to be factored in as
well. Undocumented immigrants pay sales tax, provide affordable labor
for small businesses, and inevitably make other positive contributions to
the local community. Only localities with the most pronounced immigration-related problems would be able to legislate in this arena.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The merits of the proposed model become readily apparent in its application to the facts of the trilogy of federal circuit decisions already discussed. The local ordinances at issue in those cases, essentially the same in
regard to the Constitutionally-relevant issues they present, should not be
struck down under a preemption analysis for all the reasons noted above.
If, however, the ordinances are subjected to the spotlight of an equal-protection analysis in the manner proposed, the analysis becomes (1) more
consistent with traditional understanding of field preemption and of Congressional plenary power over immigration matters; 279 (2) respects principles of federalism, preserving non-federal entities' abilities to legislate in
areas of local concern; and (3) guards against equal protection violations.
277. Id. at 220.

278. See infra notes 119-50 and accompanying text.
279. Which has been confined to issues of entry into and exit from the United States.
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Actually predicting what decision courts would make were they to
confront these ordinances under an equal protection analysis is problematic. Courts have yet to develop what issues and facts are relevant to an
equal protection approach, and of course have not indicated how the analysis would unfold. The ordinances very well could be struck down because
nothing in the record indicates that the cities of Farmers Branch, Fremont,
or Hazleton had quantifiable proof of their immigration related problems,
which, under this model, would raise an inference of discriminatory intent
and be invalidated under the Equal Protection Clause.
But whether the ordinances would be struck down is not really the
point of this Comment. The point is, where courts confront local legislation directed at undocumented immigrants, they should avoid engaging in
sometimes convoluted, results-oriented preemption analysis directed towards getting the "right" answers. Rather, this Comment proposes an
equal protection analysis designed to ask the right questions. Straightforward and better reasoned decisions-which in turn will produce legally
sound answers-will necessarily follow.
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